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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
llARBARALYON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND 
INDEl\lNITY CO~IPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and 
YOSE~IITE INSURANCE 
CO:\IPANY, ·Defendant. 
Case No. 
12068 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
LEONARD \V. BURNINGHAlH and DAVID 
B. DEE, attorneys representing numerous clients 
whose interests coincide with the issues herein, were 
granted leave by order of the above-entitled Court on 
the 31st day of July, 1970 to appear as Amicus Curiae. 
For the sake of brevity, the Amicus Curiae accepts 
statement of the case and facts as set forth in respond-
ent's Rrief and will limit its discussion to matters which 
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it feels merit additional consideration to assist the Court 
in determinintg the ultimate liability of Appellant to 
Respondent. 
ARGU~IENT 
POINT I 
ASSU.NIING THE EXISTENCE OF AN UN-
INSURED :MOTORIST INSURANCE POLICY 
\VITH THE REQUISITE LIABILITY HAV-
ING BEEN ESTABLISHED BY A SHO\VING 
THAT THE DAMAGES INCURRED 'VERE 
THE RESULT OF THE NEGLIGNCE OF AN 
UNINSURED MOTORIST AS DEFINED 
THEREIN, AN INJURED PARTY SHOULD 
BE ENTITLED TO TI-IE BENEFIT OF ALL 1 
AVAILABLE INSURANCE COVERAGE UP 
TO THE AMOUNT OF HIS INJURIES. 
Recent decisions which have construed standard 
form insurance contract clauses which limit uninsured 
motorist insurance coverage have held them void as 
against the public policy of the respective states 
invoked in that their import is to limit the insurer's 
liability under the uninsured motorist provisions of 
its policy in a manner which is against the avowed 
policy expressed in the legislative enactment of re-
quired offerings of uninsured motorist coverage. The 
leading cases in this area which have struck down 
,-arious limiting insurance clauses whether the form 
2 
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be "prorata", "excess insurance", or "excess-escape" 
are Sellers vs. United States Fidelity and Guar-
11nty Co., 185 So. 2d 689 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1966), Geyer 
r. llcscrve Insurance Co., 8 Ariz. App. 464, 447 P.2d 
;jJti ( 1968), and White v. Nationwide IJ;Jutual Insur-
ance Company, 361 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1966). 
In Sellers, the specific issue before the Supreme 
Court of the State of Florida was whether an automobile 
insurance carrier required to provide coverage against 
injury by an uninsured motorist in accordance with the 
requirements of the Florida Uninsured :Motorist Statute 
could deny such coverage on the grounds that the in-
sured had other similar insurance available to him after 
having accepted a premium for the uninsured motorist 
coverage. The statutory provisions of the State of Flor-
ida which require the offering of uninsured motorist 
coverage provide that insurance companies must make 
available to every prospective insured uninsured motor-
ist coverage in dollar amounts not less than $10,000.00. 
The Court held that the insurance carrier could not deny 
the insured party the benefit of uninsured motorist cov-
erage on the basis of limiting clauses in its insurance con-
tract where to do so would allow the insurance company 
to invalidate the minimum liability coverage set forth in 
the Florida statutory provisions. In construing the stat-
ute in light of the purpose for which it was enacted, the 
Court stated that all clauses in the insurance policy 
which were in derogation of the policy behind the statute 
n1ust be rejected, and further that said clauses were in-
eonsistent with the public policy of the state of Florida. 
3 
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The Court reasoned that in all situation where in-
surance is antilable from one or more insurers, one of 
the insurance company's contracts must be violated be-
cause ordinarily each contains clauses limiting its avail-
ability where other similar insurance exists, with each 
company claiming the other's policy to be primary in-
surance and its own to be secondary. The Court felt that 
in light of this necessity, its only alternative was to reject 
all clauses of a limiting nature in favor of the insured's 
position. The Court's holding is supported by the reason-
ing in University of J1'lorida Law Review 4, at 455. The 
Court concluded by stating: 
"It is further our view that the statute does not 
intend that an insured shall pyramid coverages 
under separate automobile policies so as to re· 
cover more than his actual bodily injury, loss 
or damage. By way of illustration, if his loss 
amounts to $30,000.00 because of bodily injury 
inflicted upon him by an uninsured motorist, we 
see no reason why, if he is the beneficiary of three 
automobile liability insurance policies, he may 
not recover the maximum allowed under each 
policy." 185 So. 2d at 692. 
Geyer v. Reserve Insurance Co., supra, a 1968 case 
handed down by the Supreme Court of the state of 
Arizona, supports the reasoning of Sellers and the posi· 
tion of the respondent in the case at bar. In Geyer, plain· 
tiff was a passenger in a vehicle which was involved in 
an accident with an uninsured vehicle. The vehicle in 
which plaintiff was riding was covered by a $10,000.00 
liability insurance policy and a $10,000.00 uninsured 
4 
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motorist policy, both of which included plaintiff in the 
c\·ent injuries resulted due to the negligence of the 
11\\ ucr of the vehicle and/ or an uninsured motorist. The 
sole question before the Court was if both the driver of 
the vehicle plaintiff was riding in and the uninsured mo-
torist were at fault, could plaintiff recover up to the limits 
of both insurance policies, provided her injuries were, in 
fact, $20,000.00 or in excess thereof. The Court held 
plaintiff could recover up to the limits of both policies 
if the driver of the vehicle and the uninsured motorist 
were both at fault . .I.llit.9ourt stated that th_~ i11s~was 
r~~Q.Jhe insured up ta ber__total legal damages 
s~h coverage did noteffect a doubl~_J.:e~.9.Y~1'Y­
in favor of th@ insu~ed. This conclusion is supported by 
the reasoning set forth in the Sellers case, supra. 
The position of the Florida Supreme Court and the 
~\.rizona Supreme Court set forth in the two decisions 
hereinabove ref erred to is supported by White v. Na-
tionwide Mutual Insurance Company, supra. In that 
case, the .Fourth Circuit Court stated that clauses in the 
insurance company's policies which limit the insurance 
company's liability should be applied to limit and reduce 
the damages of the insured or injured party, but not the 
exposure of the insurer. The Court further stated that 
to reduce the liability of the insurer on the basis of "ex-
eess' or "other insurance" clauses when the injuries of 
the insured exceed all available insurance coverage, was 
against public policy. 
The avffwecl purpose for the enactment of the Utah 
5 
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Uninsured l\Iotorist Statute, Section 41-12-21.1, UCA 
( 1953) , is to give people carrying such coverage pro-
tection from those who cause injury but because of their 
uninsured status, are not able to compensate the insured 
party. This Court has heretofore held that it must con-
sider the purpose of the entire act when construing a 
statute and that it 'vill attempt to promote the intent of 
the legislature in its application. Western Au.to Tran~. 
port v. Reese, 104 Utah 393, 140 P.2d 348 (1960). 
This Court stated in J.llartin v. Christensen, ~2 Utah 
2d 415, 454 P.2d 294 ( 1969), that ordinarily, the lan· 
guage in an insurance contract is to be given its plain, 
,common meaning. However, this Court has held that 
:where ambiguity exists, the contract will be strictly con-
strued against the insurer so as to give the insured the 
broadest protection he could have reasonably believed 
the terms of the insurance contract afforded him. P. E. ' 
Ashton v. Joyner, 17 Utah 2d 162, 406 P.2d 306 (1965). 
The insurer, by its own argument set forth in Appellant's 
Brief, admits that it is guaranteeing the insured a maxi-
mum amount of insurance, in this case $20,000.00. The 
statutory provisions in Section 41-12-21.l specifically 
state that the insured shall receive a minimum of 
$10,000.00 in uninsured motorist coverage. The insur-
ance contract of the appellant as written offers the re-
spondent not a minimum amount of insurance written in 
the face value of the policy, but a maximum amount of 
insurance by limiting its liability to respondent as a 
secondary type of insurance, and then only if the policy 
limits of its insured exceed those of all other available 
6 
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insurance. Certainly this Court cannot be persuaded 
that what the respondent thought she was buying was a 
maximum amount of insurance, regardless of who was 
at fault in the event an accident occurred. Any individ-
ual purchasing insurance in his narrowest belief would 
expect that his own insurance coverage was his mini-
mum, and not his maximum, to be added to any other 
insurance which was available in the event an accident 
occurred in which he was not at fault. Based upon the 
underlying purpose for the enactment of the Utah Un-
insured Motorist Statute and the reasoning set forth by 
this Court in Joyner, supra, the clauses in appellant's 
insurance contract which limit its liability should be 
struck down as void and against the public policy of the 
state of Utah. 
This Court struck down similar provisions of an in-
'iUrance contract when uninsured motorist coverage was 
al issue in Barnhart v. Civil Service Employees Insur .. 
ance Co., 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873 (1965). The 
Court stated: 
''The insured of not required to read, nor tb-, 
understand, nor to sign anything, but only to pay . 
his premium. The practical reality is that the lay 
purchaser is in an inferior bargaining positio 
and simply accepts unilaterally the policy as pre-
pared by the company." 16 Utah 2d at 229. 
The Courts have struck down clauses in insurance 
policies which limit the liability of the insurer on the 
grounds of public policy, but the cases set out above also 
~11ppurt the proposition that to allow the insurance com-
7 
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panies to limit their liability by way of contract where 
uninsured motorist statutes require a minimum amourn 
of coverage, is to allow the insurers to act in derogation 
of the statutory language. The Utah statute requires a 
minimum amount of uninsured motorist coverage to be 
offered to the insured in a dollar amount no less than 
$10,000.000. Therefore, since the clauses in the insur-
ance contract of appellant attempt to reduce that mini-
mum required amount, they should be struck down. This 
Utah statute is remedial in nature, and where the appel-
lant, as in this case, was required to offer uninsured mo-
torist coverage to the insured and to collect a premium 
for said coverage in the amount of $20,000.00, it should 
not be allowed to limit its liability by any clauses in its 
contract. It is respectfully submitted that if these clauses 
in appellant's insurance contract are to be given effect, 
this Court should follow the reasoning set out in White, 
supra, and hold that such clauses should be applied to 
limit and reduce the damages of the insured, but not the 
exposure of the insurer. 
Appellant's policy states that it shall be responsible 
to the insured for "all legal liability" of the uninsured 
motorist, and as such, the contract should be read in a 
light most favorable to the insured. Giving effect to 
appellant's insurance policy clauses which limit its lia-
bility would create a windfall in favor of appellant at 
the ~xpense of respondent. Therefore, appellant should 
be liable to respondent for the total face amount of its 
uninsured motorist coverage without any setoff. In no 
case, however, should appellant be liable to respondent 
8 
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for less than $10,000.00 without setoff for medical pay-
ments coverage, because such would be to alter the 
~tatutory provisions of the Utah Uninsured l\Iotorist 
Statute which must be considered a part of every policy 
of uninsured motorist coverage. See Geyer, supra. 
Appellant relies on this Court's language in il'lartin 
v. Christensen, supra. In that case, this Court stated that 
the clauses in an insurance company's contract must be 
given effect and upheld unless such holding would be 
against the public policy of this state. This writer sub-
mits that where the total damages to respondent far ex-
ced all available insurance coverage, and where appel-
lant's insurance policy is in direct contradiction to the 
statutory language of the Utah Uninsured l\Iotorist 
Statute, this Court should hold that the clauses in ap-
pellant's policy which limit its liability are null and void 
as against the public policy of this state. The Christen-
sen case, in other particular points relied upon by appel-
lant, is not material to the issues of the case at bar be-
cause no statute was involved and the holding of this 
Court therein did not violate any recognized public 
policy of the state of Utah. 
POINT II 
AN INSURER'S LIABILITY UNDER UN-
INSUH.ED lVIOTORIST PROVISIONS OF ITS 
INSURANCE CONTRACT SHOULD NOT BE· 
REDUCED BY SUBROGATION RIGHTS AC-
QPIHED PURSUANT TO THE "MEDICAL 
9 
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PAY..)lENT COVERAGE" PROVISIONS OF 
ITS POLICY. 
In Phoenix Insurance Company v. Kincaid, 199 So. 
2d 770 (Fla. App., 1967) , the Court had under consi<l· 
eration an off set provision similar to the one contained 
in the case at bar. In Kincaid, the insurer was attempt-
ing to set off payments it had made to the claimant un-
der the uninsured motorist endorsement of that same 
policy. The Court held that the clause in the insurer's 
contract which in effect permitted such setoff was void 
and against public policy, because the Florida statute 
(see Section 627.0851, F.S.A.) required uninsured mo-
torist coverage in not less than a certain minimum 
amount. The endorsement permitting the setoff of medi- 1 
cal pay benefits against amounts payable under the un-
insured motorist coverage would have had the effect of 
reducing the statutory minimum coverage below that 
prescribed by the legislature, thus violating the estab-
lished public policy of the state. In Geyer~ supra, the 
Supreme Court of the state of Arizona made the same 
observations with respect to setoff claims by the insurer 
against payments due under the uninsured motorist pro-
Yisions of its policy. The Court stated that to allow the 
insurer to set off payments made pursuant to medical 
payments provisions against payments due and owing 
as a result of uninsured motorist coverage in the_~a.!lle· 
-~vould be against the public policy of the state of 
Arizona. It further stated that the insurer cannot re-
duce the minimum coverage as set forth in the Arizona 
State Statute by setoff clauses or subrogation provisions. 
10 
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---
See also Southeast l~urniture Company and the State 
Jnsnrance Fund v. Dean L. Barrett and the Industrial 
Commission of lltah, .... Utah 2d .... , 465 P.2d 346 
(1970). 
Appellant argues that the contractual provisions of 
its insurance contract are clear and unambiguous, but 
this writer is of the opinion that appellant's insurance 
contract should be construed in light of the policies ex-
pounded by this Court in Joyner and Barnhart, supra. 
Appellant should not be allowed to plead the posi-
tion of acceptance of two- premiums for two different 
types of insurance coverage for the benefit of the in-
'.iured, and then claim against the proceeds of the insur-
ance policy as a third party beneficiary to the detriment 
and expense of the insured. The public policy of the state 
of lJ tah as expressed in the enactment of the Utah Un-
insured ~Iotorist Statute by our legislature should be 
upheld by this Court and appellant should be denied any 
setoff pursuant to its subrogation provisions of its in-
~urance contract against funds due and owing respond-
ent as a result of the uninsured motorist coverage in dis-
pute herein. 
POINT III 
IF AN INSURER IS ALLU\1VED TO SET 
OFF' PAYMENTS MADE PURSUANT TO ITS 
"MEDICAL PAYMENTS COVERAGE" PRO-
\'ISIONS OF ITS POLICY AGAINST FUNDS 
11 
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DUE AND O\VING AS A RESULT OF U~IN­
SCRED MOTORIST COVERAGE, THEN THE 
INSURER SHOULD BE LIABLE TO TJIE IN-
SURED FOR A REASONABLE ATTOUNEY'S 
FEE. 
The general rule in the state of Utah as espoused 
by this Court is that attorney's fees are not collectible in 
a legal action unless done so pursuant to contract or un-
less authorized by statute. This writer is of the opinion 
that an insurer should be liable for a reasonable attor-
ney's fee in all subrogation matters where liability is 
contested, but if that is not the present view of this 
Court, it should certainly be the rule of law in the state 
of Utah with respect to setoff against payments made 
pursuant to uninsured motorist provisions of an insurer's 
policy. 
In Feltonv. Finley, 69 Idaho 381, 209 P.2d 899 
( 1949), the Supreme Court of Idaho awarded attorney's 
fees to an attorney who had prosecuted a will contest for 
a partial number of the heirs of a decedent against non-
participating heirs of the decedent when the latter heirs 
yoluntarily accepted the benefits of the attorney's work 
by accepting additional sums of money. During the pen· 
dency of the legal action, the heirs of the decedent who 
were not participating in the suit ref used to cooperate 
with the contesting heirs in any manner whatsoever and 
refused to be responsible for any facet of the lawsuit, in· 
eluding payment of a reasonable attorney's fee. The 
Court held that the attorney was not undertaking the 
12 
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work gratuitiously and that since the benefits of his work 
were accepted voluntarily by each nonparticipating heir, 
each was liable to the attorney for a reasonable attorney's 
fee. The Court stated: 
"The rule is well established that the accept-
ance of the services rendered by an attorney may 
raise an implied promise to pay therefor, which 
will supply the place of a contract of employ-
ment. If an attorney renders valuable services, 
as in the case at bar, to one who has received the 
benefit therefor, a promise to pay the reasonable 
value of such services is presumed unless th,e 
circumstances establish the fact that such services 
wel'e intended to be gratuitous". 209 P.2d at 901. 
A more recent Idaho case which supports the same 
proposition is directly on point. In Cedarholm v. State 
Parm It-lutual Insurance Co1npanies and Farmers Mu-
tual Insurance Company, 81 Idaho 143, 338 P.2d 93 
( 1959) , the Court was asked to decide whether or not an 
insurer should be liable to the insured for a reasonable 
attorney's fee when the insured is compelled to expend 
attorney's fees to effect a recovery of funds claimed by 
the insurer pursuant to subrogation provisions of its 
policy. In this direct action by the insurer against the 
insured, the Court held that the insured was liable to the 
insurer for the amount of its subrogation rights, subject, 
however, to a reduction by the amount expended by the 
insured for collection of the funds. The Court cited the 
following excerpt from Am. J ur. as the controlling 
authority: 
13 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"The general rule is that the insured may re-
tain out of the funds recovered from the wrong· 
doer, after the payment of the policy, the costs 
a_nd reaso?able expenses. incurred in. the litiga· 
tion, for 1t would be un1ust to reqmre him to 
incur expenses. for the recovery of money for 
the benefit of the insurer, without being allowed 
to reimburse himself". 29 Am. J ur., Section 134(1 
at page 1008. 
In the case at bar, neither of the defendants would 
admit liability, and respondent was forced to proceed 
with legal action to recover for her injuries. As the ap· 
pellant has stated in its Brief, the insurer is in a peculiar 
position with respect to its insured' s status when the in· 
sured may have a claim against it pursuant to the unin· 
sured motorist provisions of its policy. In this situation, 
the insurer has a conflict of interest, on one hand being 
a plaintiff in the shoes of its insured by way of subroga· 
tion, and on the other hand being a defendant in the 
shoes of the uninsured motorist because of the uninsured 
motorist coverage. For this reason, if the Court is 
willing to allow the insurer setoff by way of subrogation 
against payments due pursuant to uninsured motorist 
coverage, the insurer should be liable to the insured for 
a reasonable attorney's fee. That is certainly the case 
in a situation where neither of the defendants are willing 
to admit liability and the injured party is forced to 
seek redress through litigation. 
14 
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CONCLUSION 
A.micus Curiae respectfully submits that appellant 
is and should be liable to respop.dent for the total face 
amount of the uninsured motorist policy written by it 
without setoff for medical payments made as a matter 
of public policy. Furthermore, if appellant is allowed 
setoff pursuant to its right of subrogation, appellant 
should be liable to respondent for a reasonable attorney's 
fee for the collection thereof. In light of the statutory 
language of the Utah Uninsured Motorist Statute, in 
no event should appell•nt be liable to respondent for less 
than $10,000.00, without setoff in any manner whatso~ 
erer which might tend to reduce the statutory minimum. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEONARD W. BURNINGHAM 
DAVID B. DEE 
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